Gulf News
Shahir Shahidsaless
After 20 months of arduous negotiations, Iran and the world’s six powers reached a landmark deal on Iran’s nuclear programme, ending one of the world’s most serious international crises in the post-Cold War era. The agreement was expected by many — including those in the United States and in Iran — to reshape US-Iran relations.
In Iran, that expectation was demonstrated by government technocrats clearly expressing optimism. Mohammad Javad Zarif, Iran’s Foreign Minister, remarked: “The [Supreme] Leader [Ayatollah Ali Khamenei] said that, if the United States shows that it is serious, that it is willing to abandon the language of coercion and threat… then we will consider other options. That is an extremely important offer that’s on the table.”
Mohammad Nahvandian, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani’s US-educated Chief-of-Staff, expressed the same sentiment and vision when he said: “It was mentioned by the supreme leader as well that this nuclear issue is a test for us to see how the other side is sincere.”
On the American side, a resolution to the dispute was about more than the nuclear issue alone. The United States administration viewed the nuclear deal as a development that could end Iran’s isolation and thus promote moderate policies in Iran that could in effect ripple throughout the region. US President Barack Obama hoped that the conclusion of the nuclear deal could usher “a new era in US-Iranian relations — and, just as importantly, over time, a new era in Iranian relations with its neighbours”.
This optimism, at least for now, appears to be unrealistic. Widespread opinions expressed in the media about the likely reconciliation between Iran and the US have made Iran’s leadership extremely nervous. As this author has repeatedly argued, the Iranian conservatives’ fear of expansion of US relations is material and significant. They are primarily worried about the prevalence of America’s pop culture and believe that it could weaken the value system of the so-called Hezbollahi faction (radical conservatives) of society, who shape the backbone of the supporters of the system.
They are also worried about the likely rise of technocrats as a result of friendlier US-Iran relations.
Following the conclusion of the nuclear deal, Iran’s leader, without mentioning the moderates, attacked those who insisted on “disguising this Great Satan as the saviour angel”, warning that “the Satan that the Iranian nation expelled through the door is trying to return through the window. We must not allow this to happen.”
He added: “We agreed to hold talks with the US only on the nuclear issue and for particular reasons… In other areas we did not and will not allow negotiations with US.”
Alarming signs
A collection of forces in Washington, particularly the Republican caucus and the Israeli lobby, fiercely block any improvement to US-Iran relations. This segues into the principal threat to the nuclear accord’s success. In October, Iran’s supreme leader had declared that Tehran would consider “any imposition of sanctions at any level and under any pretext… a violation and nullification of the [nuclear deal].”
Two American moves in December were the first alarming signs of a possible breakup of the nuclear deal. First, the US congress passed a bill that would exclude citizens of the countries who benefit from visa-free travel to the US if they have travelled to Iran (and three other countries) in the last five years. On December 20, Obama signed the new budget bill, which, among other things would eliminate the visa waiver for people who travel to Iran.
Second, the House unanimously voted to impose tough new sanctions on institutions that knowingly do business with the Iran-backed Hezbollah of Lebanon. The bill, which has already passed the Senate, now awaits Obama’s signature. This could also result in the imposition of new sanctions on Iranian banks. Moves like these could eventually result in the collapse of the nuclear agreement.
On the domestic side, radicals within Iran felt that the finalisation of the nuclear deal could contribute to the rise of moderates. Thus, the radicals entered the fray to curb the moderates’ progress. In September, the influential cleric Ali Saidi, the Leader’s representative to the IRGC, said: “Those who work under the banner of ‘moderates’ are more dangerous than the opposition.”
Both the moderates and the hardliners continually emphasise the importance and sensitivity of the two upcoming elections in Iran. In February 2016, Iran will hold two simultaneous elections, one for the country’s parliament, and the other for the powerful Assembly of Experts, whose members stand for eight-year terms and are tasked with choosing the country’s political leader and even have the power to remove him. The outcome of the latter could determine the future of the country for decades. Ahmad Khatami, a leading conservative figure and the cleric who leads Tehran’s Friday prayer, explained why.
“Ayatollah Khamenei is currently 74 years old and will be 82 in the next 8 years, and some are thinking that the next Assembly of Experts may have to decide on the next leader,” he has remarked.
It is noteworthy that candidates of all national elections in Iran — presidential, parliamentary and Assembly of Experts — are vetted by the ultra-conservative Guardian Council. In August, Rouhani attacked the Guardian Council’s expanding oversight of elections, particularly the vetting of the candidates. In December, he reiterated his position. Khamenei defended the Guardian Council’s supervisory role in elections as its “legal” and “rational right”. Implicitly referring to Rouhani’s statements, he added that some objections to the role of the Guardian Council are “gratuitous”.
To conclude, as far as foreign policy is concerned, considering that the hardliners would thwart any possibility of warmer relations with the US, it is expected that US-Iran relations will remain tense in 2016. This could intensify competition between the two states over influence in the region, which in turn may complicate Iran’s relations with its neighbors in the region.
Domestically, Rouhani, as the leading figure of the moderates, is a shrewd, informed, and outspoken politician — much harder for the hardliners to keep in check compared to the mellow-tempered reformist, President Mohammad Khatami. However, a fierce battle is expected as the elections near, and a move for adopting a tougher vetting approach by the Guardian Council in the February elections is quite predictable. This could result in conservatives’ victory (who are now divided in two camps, one more moderate than the other) and their dominance, especially in the Assembly of Experts.
