Syeda Mazhar
Battling a hydra-headed insurgency in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province (KPK), Pakistan for years has been trying come up with an effective police force critically needed to counter insurgency. An understaffed and underequipped police force is increasingly called onto manage rising insecurity and militant violence. An expanding terrorist campaign targeting Pakistan’s major cities is inextricable linked to this insurgency. The growing number of suicide attacks across Pakistan underscores the dangerous nature of the crisis.
The changing tactics and targets of the various terrorist groups operating in the country pose a formidable challenge to a police force with limited resources, poor training, and inadequate equipment. Pakistan’s civilian law enforcement structure has failed immensely to develop any systematic and advanced counterterrorism strategy owing to the lack of modern investigative tools, requisite skills, and incentives. For the exact same reasons, it is no surprise that the rate of crimes not associated with terrorism has also jumped in recent years. Law-and-order duties and VIP protection responsibilities consume a significant chunk of police resources. Corruption, nepotism, and political manipulation are rampant; they damage police integrity, credibility, and public image. An additional impediment to criminal law enforcement is the ineptitude of Pakistan’s judicial sector.
On paper, Pakistan is in better shape than, say, India, where the implementation of law and policeman to population ratio is extremely disproportionate. Pakistan also fares well vis-à-vis the UN standard for peacetime policing, especially given the nature of the crisis in Pakistan, the heightened terrorist activity and insurgency situations in FATA and parts of Balochistan Province, coupled with rising crime figures nationwide, the numbers are not as good as they appear. In the domain of counterterrorism, despite the sharp rise in terrorist attacks across the country, no significant investment has been made in specialized expertise.
The police in Pakistan have traditionally been used by the state to suppress dissent and tame opposition. Many senior police officers became politicized in recent decades in an attempt to be in the good books of any political party, and prized field appointments are often made based on political connections. Improvements to correct years of oversight of the police were attempted during the Musharraf era. For instance, the Police Act of 2002 emulated the Japanese National Safety Commission system in institutionalizing oversight of the police by public representatives at various levels, and independence of the prosecution service was encouraged to keep police high-handedness in check. Additionally, mechanisms for registering complaints against police were streamlined. However, these adjustments were deemed contrary to the political interests of the legislators and thus were diluted through amendments.
A lack of attention to developing modern investigation and interrogation techniques is another serious issue. Most police training schools are in a deplorable state due to a paucity of funds. The instructors are often officials who were removed from field duties for political reasons, and it is hardly surprising that the performance of a demoralized and sidelined faculty leaves much to be desired.
Lack of trust and coordination between the police force and intelligence outfits have been a long-standing concern for Pakistani law enforcers, and this concern is amplified by the sometimes close relationship between certain armed groups and elements of the intelligence services. Poor data collection with regard to crimes and criminals is another major lacuna in the system. Many criminals who join militant religious groups are not traced and tracked efficiently. Even banned militant organizations are not well profiled.
Military operations can substitute for police action in certain circumstances, but that creates a new set of issues, ranging from high civilian casualties to human rights violations. A disproportionate use of force is almost always counterproductive. Most militaries, including that of Pakistan, are not trained or equipped to deal with internal law-and-order crises. Ideally, the military should act as a backup force that is ready to move in if needed in support of police action.
To fully reform Pakistan’s police, policy makers in Pakistan and across the globe will need to better understand the root causes of the problem. This is critical to replacing the current capture-and-kill approach with a methodology that seeks to rehabilitate captured militants and address the causes of terrorism. While Pakistan has already made some progress in this area through its de-radicalization program, the initiative remains limited in scope. Maintaining good relations with the public is crucial to the success of all police activity. This is especially relevant with regard to the treatment of women, children, and minorities. The average Pakistani citizen does not trust the police.
No modern state can sustain itself in an unstable environment, let alone develop and progress. Although the domains of internal and external security are equally important in this context, developing states are generally inclined to dedicate greater resources to the latter. Arguably, however, internal challenges such as terrorism and ethnic or sectarian conflict can be just as destabilizing and destructive as military confrontation with an enemy state. When faced with a serious internal security crisis, it is crucial that a state pursue reform that entails capacity building within the law enforcement sector.
This would require the police leadership to lead and manage to achieve, at the very least, the following key objectives: Security of tenure to police key appointment holders, de-politicisation of police, adequate provision for strategic capacity building of police, substantial change in the work ecology of police, especially for lower ranks, providing an adequate police budget and using it efficiently, transformation of police from a public-frightening force to a public-friendly service organization.
