THIS IS MY STORY—72
MY JOURNEY THROUGH THE ERA OF AYUB KHAN TO THE TIMES OF IMRAN KHAN.
GHULAM AKBAR…….
America In Action
Whereas it was true that widespread goodwill for Pakistan existed in occupied Kashmir, it was unrealistic to expect that this feeling of resentment against India could be mobilized within a very short time and thereby made the execution of large scale operations behind Indian lines possible. The selection of personnel, many of whom knew neither the area nor the language, made the operation in occupied territory a difficult task. The operation was launched as hurriedly as it had been conceived, and it was surprising that with all these drawbacks it was such a success. The stepping up of the tempo, however, was not gradual enough to give it the character of an internal uprising, nor was it controlled sufficiently to keep t within the bounds of Indian political and military acceptability. When the Indians were faced with a rapidly escalating situation, which endangered their position in Kashmir, they were persuaded by the army to retaliate. This they decided to do in an area in Azad Kashmir which would be strategically important enough to recapture some of the lost prestige that India had suffered and the loss of which would place Pakistan military at a disadvantage. The Haji Pir Pass, which provided Pakistan with a link between the northern and southern sectors of Azad Kashmir, was a natural region which fitted this pattern. On 24 August the Indians launched a strong attack on Azad Kashmir positions in this area, which were relatively lightly held, and by the 28th they were in control of sufficient territory to cut the shortest line of communication between Muzaffarabad, the capital of Azad Kashmir, and Kotli a major communication centre in the southern half of Azad Kashmir. The attack on Haji Pir Pass was the first major violation of the cease-fire line by organized military formations in eighteen years and gave a fresh dimension to the conflict. Pakistan was left with little alternative but to retaliate in an area in which the Indians were vulnerable and where a relatively small effort could produce decisive results. The Chamb-Akhnur area, which permitted the use of armour and which would provide a base that could threaten the valley, was selected for the purpose. No. 7 Infantry Division, located south of Lahore, was ordered to move to the Chamb area. The attack was, however, to be carried out initially by a brigade placed under No. 12 Division, commanded by Major-General Akhtar Hussain Malik. The move of No. 7 Division from its concentration area south of Lahore had far—reaching consequences and was a decision of great significance. This Division, along with No. 1 Armoured Division, formed our main counterattack force and thus the main punch of our Army.
Its move, away from the area of concentration could only mean that the use of this force against India was not considered likely, at least until after No. 7 Division could return to its concentration area.
As formations of No. 12 Division moved swiftly towards Akhnur, India was faced with a difficult military situation. Just as we had not expected an attack on the Haji Pir Pass, the Indians did not expect an attack in such strength in the Chamb-Akhnur Sector. The use of tanks and heavy artillery was, moreover, unprecedented in the Azad Kashmir conflict, and Pakistan’s initial successes created considerable panic in Jammu and throughout occupied Kashmir, and shock and surprise in India. The capture of Akhnur by Pakistan would seriously threaten the lines of communication between India and the Kashmir Valley and it could result in the loss of a large portion of the Indian Army in northern and central Kashmir. Its effect on the morale of the Indian Army could have been catastrophic and the effect on the nation’s will to face Pakistan would certainly have suffered a serious blow. The Indians were left with little choice but to remove this threat to the security of their vital strategic areas and, rather than confine the contest to Azad Kashmir, decided to extend the area of conflict to West Pakistan.
Of all the places in West Pakistan, Tahore was the natural choice. An important communications centre and the political and cultural capital of West Pakistan, it has a special place in the hearts and minds of all Pakistanis. A threat to its security could not fail to draw forces to its defence, and this could well remove the threat to Jammu and Akhnur.
It is possible that the Indians started their offensive with this limited objective. They had not, I believe, reckoned on the all-out retaliation that this attack caused. Only thus can their decision not to use their Air Force on 6 September—except to attack a railway train near Wazirabad—be explained. When the attack on Lahore triggered off a full-scale war, their armour, which had already been moved to the Jammu Sialkot area, was launched in what turned out to be their main offensive against Pakistan.
No. 7 Division’s move to the Chamb area was completed on the morning of the 2nd, about thirty six hours after the offensive launched by No. 12 Division. On the same day, Major-General Yahya Khan, the General Officer Commanding No. 7 Division, was given command of this sector and Major-General Akhtar Malik was ordered to return to his earlier location further north. This had a profound effect on the course of operations in this area and on that of the war with India. Akhtar Malik had conceived the general strategy of operations in his area of responsibility, which included the Chamb-Akhnur sector. He had been instrumental in persuading the President to embark on a course of action which had led to this situation and he felt a personal stake in the outcome of this contest. By temperament and outlook, moreover, he was suited to lead an operation that required boldness and vigour. Above all, he was on the move and was making satisfactory progress. Yahya Khan, with part of a force located about two hundred miles away, and had been preparing for months now for a completely different role. His move to the Chamb area involved a major administrative and logistical switch which was completed with speed and with the inevitable problems that attend such unplanned moves of large military formations.
