Abdullah Mustafvi
it is a popular argument among the political and security experts that the present national government of Afghanistan, which is generally referred as the National Unity Government (NUG), may not split apart on the expiry of its power sharing deal, mainly because of international pressure and support. However, in such scenario, a political crisis could not be ruled out at the lower tier of the organization or supporters of both the power sharing giants. These elements were and are desperate to entangle into a situation, where there would be an unambiguous winner and loser. Parallel to the emerging political crisis, the events related to security failures are also continuously highlighting the Afghan government’s inability to tackle the worsening security situation. The Afghan security apparatus even fell short of the least expected resistance against their staunch enemy; Taliban. Probably, it was hypothetically assumed by the donor countries led by US that Afghan forces would be able to fight and defend their country.
Experts, opine that due to the withdrawal pressure on the US troops deployed in Afghanistan, the US authorities in Afghanistan, haphazardly trained and equipped the Afghan forces, without taking into account the basics and essential requirements of the recruitment process including the integrity and affiliation of the recruiting individuals. Ultimately, it resulted in the establishment of an incongruous and unwilling Afghan force, who are still not able and willing to fight against Taliban. Besides, a considerable number of Afghan soldiers defected to Taliban camp, the incidents of ‘Green on Blue’ also increased, which resulted into a gulf of mistrust between the training foreign forces and Afghan forces .The defection process of Afghan soldiers and voluntary joining of Afghan youths with Taliban, not only enhanced their offensive capability against the Afghan government and occupying forces but it also helped to fine tune their tactics, coordination and communication skills. The said situation created a very gruesome scenario for the occupying forces in Afghanistan. keeping in view the deteriorating security situation and Afghan forces inability to defend their country, the US administration postponed the earlier plan of complete withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan. It was decided at later stage that a robust but an efficient deployment of US troops would be maintained for a longer period in Afghanistan.
The Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) between US and Afghan governments was meant to legitimize the longer stay of the US forces and their offensive against any aggressor. After equipping and training the Afghan security apparatus by the donor countries led by US , it was considered sufficient and lot of false expectations were attached with regards to their performance and ability to safeguard the territorial sovereignty of Afghanistan and their core interests in Afghanistan. All the estimates and claims got shattered, when day after day discrepancies and real performance of Afghan security forces came to light while facing the fierce offensive of Afghan Taliban . Experts opine that , practically it was an exaggerated expectation from the Afghan forces to play the role which even the collective allied forces were not able to do in Afghanistan. Besides, expecting unwilling Afghan soldiers to turn the tide of the Afghan Taliban’s successes, on the basis of being the sons of the soil and know how of the terrain and traditions, all these theories were proven wrong, when it came to real battlefield. Afghan forces failed miserably to counter Taliban’s brutal and well coordinated offensive. It is worth mentioning that fall of Kunduz and capturing of other strategic districts and cities of Afghanistan, either permanently or temporarily by Taliban, seemed to display their ability of capturing any place in Afghanistan. The eye opening event of fall of Kunduz ,not only shocked the international community but it also disappointed the Afghan government over the performance claims of her forces. After the thorough investigation, ordered by the Afghan government for looking into the factors which led the fall of Kunduz , it came to light that Afghan forces did not resist Taliban offensive. Whereas, the Afghan forces took the plea , that there was an insufficient reinforcement of troops in Kunduz which forced them to withdraw from Kunduz. The commander of Afghan forces deployed in Kunduz ,General Murad , also blamed the Afghan government that despite of his continuous demand of reinforcement, prior to the Taliban’s offensive, no heed was paid to provide the requisite men and material. it clearly depicts the state of affairs at the top level of the government in Afghanistan.
Experts believe that in the present scenario, the National Unity Government (NUG) would need to seriously tackle the deteriorating security situation, coupled with political and constitutional crisis. Mishandling of any crisis would prove lethal and detrimental for Kabul’s embryonic democratic process and political structure. Earlier, it was predicted by political experts that the power sharing deal, brokered by the US Secretary of State John Kerry in September 2014 between President Ashraf Ghani and the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, might be extended for another two years, if mutually agreed by the power sharing giants. As per the terms of the agreement, the NUG was required to introduce a number of political and electoral reforms within two years to pave the way for Parliamentary elections, followed by the convening of a constitutional Loya Jirga (grand assembly of the tribal elders) to amend the constitution to transform the CEO’s office into the office of the Prime Minister. However, given the dysfunctional nature of the NUG, the Ghani-Abdullah duo has not been able to honor its commitments. In light of the above, the political future of the NUG remains uncertain. If the needed constitutional amendments are not introduced, which look next to impossible at this point in time, it could create a split between the two leaders and their followers, which may even end up in a brief civil war in Kabul. The possibility of such an event can not be ruled out , as the political bickering and differences between Mr Ghani and Mr Abdullah are now an open secret.
It is pertinent to mention here that Abdullah’s supporters include powerful warlords and key figures of the Northern alliance group, such as commander Ismail Khan, the former Governor of western Herat province; Atta Muhammad Noor, the Governor of Northern Balkh province; and Amrullah Saleh, the former Afghan spy chief. This group has also raised its own armed militias, parallel to Afghan security forces, to fight against any adversary. The deteriorating situation took an ugly twist last month, when the Afghan CEO publicly criticized and embarrassed the Afghan President in a press conference. Abdullah censured Ghani for not meeting him for the last three months and declared him unfit to run the country. Abdullah’s tone became particularly harsher towards Ghani, when the latter unilaterally nominated Ahmed Yousuf Nuristani as Head of the Independent Election Commission of Afghanistan and Nader Naderi as Chairman of the Public Service Commission. President Ghani responded by calling Abdullah irresponsible and accused him of violating the spirit of governance. Whereas, Mr Abdullah and his supporters are demanding political concessions, financial incentives, and a greater share in key ministries in exchange for future support and cooperation. They are also demanding the President to give up his centralized style of ruling along with relinquishing micro- management of the government . Experts opine that if the current security and political crisis situation remain unresolved , it would plunge the present government into collapse at a stage; when Afghanistan is needing stable and long-term government for evolving and sustaining the direly needed security and political stability.
