Afia Ambreen
Recently, Global Times, an English language Chinese state owned newspaper, in an editorial titled ‘India needs to cool its missile fever’ admonished New Delhi for breaking United Nations limits on its development of nuclear weapons and long range ballistic missile following a missile test by India. The successful test of the Agni-IV intercontinental nuclear capable ballistic missile, which has a strike range of 4,000 kilometres, had been lauded by Indian media for its ability to cover entire China and its value as a deterrence against possible Chinese aggression.
It is important to note that India and China both maintain “no first use” policy as part of their nuclear doctrine. The policy means exactly what it sounds like in the event of a war, the country won’t use nuclear weapons unless they are attacked by an enemy using nuclear weapons. But India’s hawkish defense minister, Manohar Parrikar, publicly mused in November last year whether India should be bound by the “no first use” policy. Parrikar said, “If a written down policy exists, or you take a stand on a nuclear aspect, I think you are truly giving away your strength in nuclear. Why should I bind myself? I should say I’m a responsible nuclear power and I will not use it irresponsibly.” Ironically, Parrikar is not the only one in India questioning the “no first use” doctrine. A professor of national security studies at the Indian Centre for Policy Research Bharat Karnad said, “Nuclear deterrence is a curious thing it succeeds when it creates doubts in the mind of the adversary state, and doubt is created in the nuclear realm by being precisely ambiguous about your intentions, your capabilities and about the possibilities of its use.” The likely reason for this particular reaction is that China has begun to see developing Indian capabilities and intentions through the lens of the multi dimensional security challenges that India could pose over the medium term. First among these is the enhancement of India’s conventional capability, which China believes could have a direct impact on the situation in Tibet and over the boundary dispute. Second, China looks upon India’s strategic relations in the Asia-Pacific region, particularly growing India-U.S. and India-Japan strategic partnerships and the convergence of maritime democracies, as a part of a process aimed at China’s strategic containment. When it comes to India’s nuclear capabilities, China’s steadfast stand has been that India is not an internationally recognized nuclear-weapons state under the terms of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Therefore, India’s ability to produce nuclear weapons does not accord it international recognition as a nuclear-weapons state. Notwithstanding this Chinese position, India’s status as an unofficial nuclear-weapons state is beginning to rankle due to India’s growing role as an emerging power and the changing geopolitics of the Asia-Pacific region as a whole.
On the other hand, China’s growing political and economic ties with India’s neighbors are also a subject of concern. Delhi watches warily increasing Chinese interactions political and commercial with and involvement in countries like Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Nepal and Sri Lanka. Concern about a military dimension being added persists. Beijing’s increasing interest in operating in the Indian Ocean, which India has traditionally considered its backyard, has also not gone unnoticed. While China emphasizes that these activities have benign goals-economic development, security for its ships, etc.-some in India who tend to take a hawkish position are not convinced; others are taking a wait-and-see attitude. Even beyond the neighborhood, there are concerns about competition with China for markets, influence and resources across the globe.
Relations between contemporary China and India have been characterised by border disputes, resulting in three military conflicts the Sino-Indian War of 1962, the Chola incident in 1967, and the 1987 Sino-Indian skirmish. Despite growing economic and strategic ties, there are several hurdles for India and the China to overcome. India faces trade imbalance heavily in favour of China. The two countries failed to resolve their border dispute and Indian media outlets have repeatedly reported Chinese military incursions into Indian territory. Both countries have steadily established military infrastructure along border areas. Additionally, India remains wary about China’s strong strategic bilateral relations with Pakistan, while China has expressed concerns about Indian military and economic activities in the disputed South China Sea.
