Nazia Nazar
India has always desired and attempted to disintegrate Pakistan. Its nefarious role in creation of Bangladesh has been stated in many a book written by independent analysts and writers, and this fact has been admitted by the Prime Minister Narendra Modi more than once. Now, Indian establishment is endeavoring to create dissentions in Balochistan, GB and Azad Kashmir to harm Pakistan’s territorial integrity. On the one hand, India is behind acts of terrorism all over Pakistan through its proxies including “Jamaat-ul-Ahrar”, whereas, on the other hand, India is fomenting sectarian strife through target killings of local sectarian leaders in Gilgit-Baltistan. Baloch sub-nationalists are also enticed and supported to create hurdles for CPEC. Indian deep state (permanent military-intelligence-diplomatic bureaucracy) intends to escalate tensions inside Pakistan to cover up the protests that have been rocking Indian-Held Kashmir for the past six months.
Indian media is all too eager to assist, having gone overboard in their characteristic jingoism by even comparing Balochistan to Bangladesh. It is likely that an intense and orchestrated media campaign on Balochistn will be re-invigorated during this month on the occasion of Baloch National day celebrations. India doesn’t want Balochistan’s infrastructure development and standard of living of the people to improve because this would help make Balochistan as an integrated and stable part of Pakistan. Instead, Modi’s speech and the cascade of hyper-nationalist commentary followed by stage managed incidents like Uri etc. are fraught with dangers. They hope that Pakistan will fall for the bait and overreact and create a larger self-perpetuating cycle of violence. Internationally, India is trying to create misunderstandings between Pakistan and Iran, but Iran’s leadership cannot be duped by India’s anti-Pakistan plot as Indian-encouraged Pakistani Baloch separatism directly affects Iran.
Modi’s aggressive posture and confession that he supports Baloch separatism in Pakistan, is bound to lead to a destabilization of the Iranian province of Sistan o Balochistan hosting Chabahar port. Moreover, Indian posturing of “Free Balochistan” coincidentally aligns with the US’ grand strategy for Pak-Iran and Afghanistan, as the US also desires to undermine economic stability of Iran and Russia and long-term future outlook. Washington could ‘kill two birds with one stone’ by targeting Sistan and Balochistan Province with co-opted fighters from the separatist war in Pakistan in order to harm both Moscow and Tehran’s strategic long-term economic interests in Chabahar. Moreover, Iran being the next door neighbouring Islamic country needs to weigh and understand the security concerns of Pakistan vis-à-vis Indian pronounced belligerency towards Pakistan, and should not become an instrument to a new regional conflict.
India continues violations at Line of Control and working boundary; and it is resorting to jingoism. In January 2017, Indian Army chief Bipin Rawat, said, “The two-front is a real scenario. Much has changed from before in terms of our capabilities…The Army, Navy and IAF are now jointly very much prepared for such an eventuality.” Earlier, former Indian Army Chief General Dalbir Singh, without naming the Cold Start Doctrine said that armed forces are capable of defending the sovereignty and territorial integrity of their country against any foreign aggression. He had said: “We are acutely aware that the swift and short nature of future war is likely to offer limited warning time, which calls for maintaining very high levels of operational preparedness at all times.” However, a senior foreign ministry official reportedly dismissed the Indian army chief’s warning as ‘mere rhetoric’ saying there was no possibility of a ‘limited war’ between the two nuclear-armed neighbors.
The head of the then command Lt. General A.S. Lamba had once said that a massive thrust in Rawalpindi could quiet Pakistanis within 48 hours of the start of the assault. According to him Cold Start Doctrine was an Exclusively Offensive, Blitzkrieg inspired military strategy, reportedly developed by the Indian Military Command (IMC), specifically for Pakistan to replace the outdated ‘Sundarji Doctrine’ which miserably failed during 2001-2002 standoff with Pakistan. Later, work on the new war doctrine i.e. Cold Start doctrine was planned to reflect the reconfiguration of threat perceptions and security challenges. Indian leadership should not exacerbate the tensions in Asia, and should understand the consequences of saber-rattling and ultimate war with two atomic states. It should also understand that during peace time, army generals should not come out with aggressive statements because that can be construed as declaration of war.
Indian “Cold Start” doctrine has been there since 2002/2003; however it failed to convince many Defence Analysts within India and beyond as a practical doctrine. Pakistan responded by developing her own New Concept of War Fighting (NCWF) and has addressed both modes; conventional and nuclear. Since “Cold Start” was more in cognitive domain and aimed at psychologically putting pressure on Pakistani leadership, NCWF checked it in physical and psychological domains. Limited war on the subcontinent poses a serious risk of escalation based on a number of factors that are not necessarily under the control of the policy makers or military leaders who would initiate the conflict. A history of misperception, poor intelligence, and India’s awkward national security decision-making system suggests that “Cold Start” could be a risky undertaking that may increase instability in South Asia.
An assessment of war games conducted in past seven years as well as organizational developments within India’s military suggests that “Cold Start” has consistently failed to meet its lofty objectives, and is dead for all practical purposes. As the Indian Army enhances its ability to achieve a quick decision against Pakistan, political leaders in New Delhi may be more inclined to employ force in a future conflict-with potentially catastrophic results. In contrast to the Cold War, where the low risk that conventional conflict between the superpowers would escalate to the nuclear level, actually facilitated low-level conflict in the periphery. Scholars who study the South Asian nuclear balance, have argued that if a limited clash between India and Pakistan were to expand into a full-scale conventional war, escalation to the nuclear level would likely result. Indian politico- military leadership cannot answer the stability-instability paradox that Cold Start Doctrine would generate.
