Nazia Nazar
As the name suggests, “Lessons Learned Program” was initiated to identify lessons from the U.S. reconstruction experience in developing Afghanistan’s Security forces, and to make recommendations to Congress and executive agencies on ways to improve efforts in current and future operations. The team’s reports focus on key aspects of the reconstruction effort and document what the U.S. government sought to accomplish, assess what it achieved, and evaluate the degree to which these efforts helped the United States reach its strategic goals in Afghanistan. The directorate is composed of subject matter experts with considerable experience of working and living in Afghanistan and aided by a team of experienced research analysts. In producing its reports, the Lessons Learned Program also uses the significant skills and experience found in SIGAR’s Audits, Investigations, and Research and Analysis Directorates as well as the Office of Special Projects.
Center for Strategic international Studies (CSIS), Washington DC recently arranged a discussion event with John F. Spoko, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR). The event was titled “Lessons from Developing Afghanistan’s Security Forces” and to discuss SIGAR’s new report on the subject. It was observed that Afghan government is sustaining high causalities and striving hard to provide security to the citizens and good governance. Nonetheless, it has been facing many problems and challenges; hence there is need for sending troops to strengthen, advise and assist mission and help Afghanistan to stand on its own feet. It was admitted that US government was ill-prepared to conduct effective security assistance as required in Afghanistan and is not well organized to conduct assistance mission on larger scale. This is true, but one would not agree with the observation that Afghan government is striving for good governance.
Developing foreign military and police capabilities is a wholesome task of government mission; however, there is a large hole in US government-led reconstruction activity, which is exacerbated by continual deployment of new and inexperienced forces for security sector assistance mission. Another finding was that the work style of military plans and training programs the westerners selected for the ANDSF had many shortcomings and prevented Afghanistan from effectively managing its forces. This resulted in ANDSF’s inability to secure the country from threats and re-establishment of safe havens for terrorists. Contrary to earlier propaganda, it was believed that the greatest threat to Afghanistan’s stability is factional fighting and not Pakistan. Deficiencies in Afghanistan’s security forces, including the military and police, are getting renewed attention, and the US administration has decided to send more than 3,000 additional troops to the country.
According to a report from the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), published recently, the US has so far spent $70bn on training Afghan forces since 2002 and is still spending more than $4bn a year. Despite this heavy spending on armed forces, Afghan government controls less than 60 percent of Afghanistan, with almost half the country either contested or under the control of the militants mainly the Taliban. The report said US forces focused on carrying out military operations during the initial years after the 2001 invasion rather than developing the Afghan army and police. There are indeed lessons to be learnt from the SIGAR’s reports, but the fact remains that it was due to the flawed policies and strategies of the US government that the Taliban control about 50 per cent of Afghanistan. The biggest mistake was that Pakistan’s contribution was not acknowledged.
On 7th October 2001, the US had launched Operation Enduring Freedom with the United Kingdom. One could see the flawed strategy of the US that it sent some 12000 army personnel, which remained in Bagram base and 6000 British soldiers stayed put in Kabul. This was the position from 2001 to 2003. NATO became involved in ISAF in August 2003, and later that year assumed its leadership. In the meantime, the Taliban fighters reorganized themselves and became a force to reckon with. The US at one time had a 100,000 plus soldiers in Afghanistan; with NATO troops, the number was over 150,000. Moreover, NATO had raised and trained 150000 Afghan army and about 100000 police, but they could not defeat the Taliban who control about 50 per cent of Afghanistan. In this backdrop, Haqqani militants who are part of the Taliban do not need Pakistani soil, as they have enough territory to train and operate from there.
