- And as the Taliban have reclaimed land with every passing year, the Americans are just as clueless now as they were when this long war started 17 years ago.
Arab News
Shahab Jafry
The strangest thing happened in Pakistan just as Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi was preparing for his meeting with US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in Washington. All eyes were on Qureshi, naturally, since the meeting was supposed to “reset” the “powerful relationship” that had pretty much collapsed in the last years of Pakistan’s previous government. Everybody expected him to sell the ‘new government’ and ‘new policy’ line well enough for the Americans to resume financial aid as well as military training.
Yet just two days before this landmark meeting the Afghan government sent a high-powered delegation to Pakistan. Quite surprisingly, though, they didn’t come to talk to the Pakistani government, but an 82-year old cleric fondly remembered by Afghan insurgents as ‘the father of the Taleban’. Maulana Sami ul Haq runs Pakistan’s most notorious religious seminary, the Darul Uloom Haqqania, besides heading his own political party, the Jamiat e Ulema e Islam – Sami (JUI-S). Many of Afghanistan’s most prominent Taleban, including perhaps Mullah Omar, are old graduates of his seminary.
He’s been close to all sorts of governments in Pakistan. He was head of the Senate foreign relations committee during Musharraf’s time. And Nawaz Sharif appointed him head of the important committee supposed to make peace with the Pakistani Taleban. That is when he famously said that “the Taleban are not fighting against the federation (of Pakistan), they are fighting to save it.” The talks failed and led to the initiation of Pakistan’s military offensive against the insurgents who had taken more than 50,000 lives.
He’s in a good place in Imran Khan’s books as well. In 2016, when PTI (Pakistan Tehreek e Insaf) was in power in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, it shocked everybody by allocating Rs300 million for the controversial religious seminary. Imran Khan personally defended the decision, saying it would help bring reforms in the madrassa system. Later, he put off long time party loyalists by contemplating an election alliance with Sami. It was Imran’s relationship with Sami, more than anything else, that concerned onlookers. He had gone so far to the right (of centre) that some worried he might fall off the edge.
The delegation, which included representatives of the Afghan government, religious leaders, some of Sami’s old students and the Afghan ambassador to Pakistan, apparently wanted the Maulana to lean on his old students in favour of talks with the Afghan government. Having long lost all faith in Pakistan’s ability to broker talks, and fed up with shifting, and contradictory, US strategies, Afghan President Ghani seems resorting to unconventional tactics out of sheer desperation. It is he, after all, that must answer for all the loss of life and territory to his people while the Americans weigh options thousands of miles away. And if by some miracle he could get the old Maulana to exercise some sort of restraining influence on his ‘children’, then all the better in light of the landmark parliamentary election due on October 20.
But, predictably, the old man was no help at all. Taleban field commanders might respect their mentors, but they’ve been in no mood to take orders from anyone for a while now. Since they are winning the fighting they are more reluctant than their superiors for peace right now. They want more land so they can have more leverage.
Shah Mahmood didn’t do much better with Mike Pompeo, either. That is why he came out of the meeting with words like “useful, engaging and forward-looking,” instead of something quantifiable like aid, money, training and so on. And the reason, once again, is failure to “do more” in Afghanistan. Pakistan, for its part, has come to the realisation that any potential thaw with America rests on the Afghan endgame. “My road to Washington is via Kabul,” Shah Mahmood said after the meeting. The Americans are still without a clear strategy. Back in the day when they thought they still had the initiative and “did not talk to terrorists,” Pakistan was always painted the double-dealing villain when it advocated separating Taleban from al Qaeda and negotiating with the former.
Instead they lumped the two and bombed Afghans, doing wonders for the Taleban’s recruitment drive. Since then they have tried more attacks, less attacks, no talks and arm-twisting everybody for talks. And as the Taleban have reclaimed land, the Americans are just as clueless now as they were when this long war started 17 years ago.
Even if they are partially right about Pakistan’s alleged safe havens, they exaggerate the ability of cross-border militias. According to a BBC study in January 2018, the militants are active in approximately 70 per cent of the country. They are in full control of 14 districts (4pc of the country) and have ‘an active and open physical presence’ in 263 (66pc). Surely they don’t attribute all of this to Pakistan’s slippery border.
Stopping Pakistan’s aid and military programmes will not rollback these gains in any way. It could, however, compromise the only player that can still bring some sort of influence to bear on the Taleban, especially if the Americans are right about their (Pakistan’s) duplicity.
