Asghar Khan Writes
I found it difficult to believe that the President, who had always been cautious in his approach to international relations, particularly as they affected our contacts with India, should have agreed to a policy that had the germs of a conflict on a major scale. In the first week of August we read in the newspapers, of the incursion of Azad Kashmir volunteers across the cease-fire line into Indian—held Kashmir. As these incursions began to increase in intensity it became obvious that a major shift had occurred in our policy towards Kashmir.
Until a few months earlier, Ayub Khan had recoiled whenever a suggestion had been made that we should encourage just such a development and accept the risk that such a move entailed. What had happened to cause this change in his thinking?
Ayub Khan, like most other Pakistanis, had felt exasperated by India’s attitude on Kashmir but he, more than the rest of his countrymen, had believed in seeking a peaceful solution to the issue. When his overtures towards India, culminating in his meeting with Pandit Nehru in 1960, produced no results, his sense of frustration increased. During this period of disappointment certain international events had a gradual but nevertheless significant effect on his thinking. The heroic struggle of the Algerian people and the eventual withdrawal of French power from North Africa; the conflict in Viet Nam, and Indonesia’s confrontation against Malaysia influenced his thinking. The failure of a large power like the United States to win a military victory in Viet Nam, and Indonesia’s success in keeping British forces in South-East Asia fully stretched, showed the inherent strength of well—led national movements against outside forces.
The sharp and successful encounter of the Pakistan Army with Indian Forces in the Rann of Kutch area further reinforced Ayub Khan’s rising faith in our inherent strength. The Rann of Kutch operation also did much to bolster Musa’s morale and his assessment of the Army’s strength rose in proportion to Ayub Khan’s increased faith in the military superiority of our forces. The unlimited capacity of some people for flattery found full play in the wake of successes in the Rann of Kutch operation. Other well-meaning and honest observers were genuinely proud of our Army’s performance and they expressed these feeling whenever the opportunity arose. The press also played its part in creating an atmosphere of triumph and invincibility. This would have affected lesser mortals than Musa, who now began to show greater confidence in his own ability and that of the Army to deal with India. Finding the President more receptive to a bolder course in relationship with India, the Foreign Office began to take a tougher line. Senior civil servants supported this line of thought and G.H.Q. was persuaded to produce a plan of action. The task was entrusted to Major-General Akhtar Hussain Malik, the General Officer Commanding No. 12 Division, who was responsible for the defence of Azad Kashmir. A bold and imaginative officer, the plan reflected his outlook and character. Thus was Operation ‘Gibraltar’ born. The President’s approval of the plan was acclaimed by top civilian advisers and Musa, seeing which way the President’s was inclined, lent it his full support against his basic instincts and military judgment.
This decision was based on three important premises. It was assumed that widespread support existed within occupied Kashmir to make such a guerilla campaign a success. It was also considered unlikely that, as a consequence of this action, India would be inclined to attempt a large-scale military offensive against Azad Kashmir territory. Lastly, the possibility of India crossing the international frontier either in East or West Pakistan was ruled out.
