Arshad Rahim
Historical Background
At the time of independence Gwadar had been under the suzerainty of the sultanate of Muscat and Omansince 1784. Soon after independence its potential as a port was pointed out by a naval officerCommander Jackson serving in the Directorate of Ports and Shipping as its Director. In 1954, at the request of the Government of Pakistan, the US Geological Survey engaged the firm Worth Condrick to carryout a survey of Pakistan’s coast. Thefirm confirmed the feasibility of development of Gwadar as a deep sea port long before its purchase from the Sultan of Oman on 7September 1958. Its development, however, had to wait a long time because of the huge investment required for the development not only of the port but also the supporting infrastructure across theentirestretch of the difficultand barren terrain of Baluchistan.
The initiative for the development of Gwadar into a deep water port eventually came from China at the turn of the twentieth century. China felt that Gwadar would provide the shortest route of access to sea not only to the less developed western region of China but also through it to central Asian states and Russia. It would also enable China to circumvent the Straits of Malacca through which the entire sea traffic to China from the west is routed and whose vulnerability in passage through the straits has been a major Chinese concern.
Construction of the port was commenced in 2002 and on completion of the first Phase in 2007 it was leased to Port of Singapore Authority (PSA) for 40 years. The lease was, however, terminated in 2013 with the consent of the firm and the construction and operation of the port was reverted back to the Chinese government.Since then it is being operated by the state owned firm China’s Overseas Port Holding Company.
In early twenty-first centuryVarious ideas concerning Asian mainland’s access to seafloating were tied up by China in a breathtaking proposal of global significance titled ‘Belt and Road Initiative’andannounced by China’s paramount leader Xi Jinping in September and October 2013 in visits to Kazakhstan and Indonesia. The primary object of this initiative is to create a ‘unified large market’. To that end it initially aims to redress the infrastructure gaps in less developed areas of the belt through massive investments in highways, railways, power and many other sectors.With the most important leg CEPEC of this Chinese mega project restingon Gwadar its development along with relevant infrastructure received a big boost in 2015.
Pakistan’s Strategic Concerns
After the 1971 war Pakistan Navy underwent a major reorganization. This involved shifting of Naval Headquarters to Islamabad, setting up of Naval Air Arm, and development of coastal defense infrastructure including a full-fledged naval base at Ormara.
The development of Gwadar port and a Naval Base at Ormara has significantly improved Pakistan’s overall strategic posture with respect to the perennial Indian threat by providing it the much needed strategic depth. An alternate communication line running along the entire north-south stretch of Pakistan west of river Indus offsets to a large extent the adverse effects of the vulnerability of Pakistan’s communication lines running close to its eastern border.
The layout ofthe coastal infrastructure has improved manifold the maritime defenseposture ofPakistan.It has enhanced the interception capability of Pakistan Navyand increased the vulnerability of Indian warships and submarines operating along Pakistan’s coast.For instance, the Indian Osa missile boats would not have been launch and get away with a missile attackon Pakistan Navy ships had they been operating fromOrmarainstead of Karachi in the 1971 war. Similarly Pakistan’s ability of detection of Indian submarines deployed for interdiction of shipping traffic along the coast has significantly improved.In recent years Indian submarines have been detected south of Ormaraat least on two occasions in 2016 and 2019 and forced to leave Pakistan’s waters. The second incident was soon after the shooting down of two Indian warplanes in February in Azad Kashmir when tensions were high and the forces of the two countries on high alert. On this Occasion an Indian submarine operating south of Ormara with hostile intent was detected, tracked, localized and forced to withdraw.
The most important but historically and currently the most contentious leg of the Belt and Road initiative is the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor(CPEC)which rests on Gwadar port which is an equally vital andsensitive sea-land transition center of the mega project. India’s involvement in malicious activities in Baluchistan to undermine this project have now been confirmed by an inadvertent leak in the Indian press by an ex-member of RAW and also implicit in the recent judgement of the International Court of Justice(ICJ) in Kulbhushan Jadhav’s case filed by India.
Keeping in view the Indian meddling in Baluchistan, and with Gwader feeding the most important strip (CPEC) of Belt and Road Initiative through Baluchistan across the vast Asian mainland to Europe and beyond, it is imperative for Pakistan to ensure the security of communication linesfeeding Gwadar over land and sea.Security of Gwadar port and the relevant sea lines of communicationsis one of the primary tasks of Pakistan Navy.
It is of course true that Pakistan Navy faces an adversary several times larger in size and capability in the north Arabian Sea.However, over the years the Pakistan Navy has evolved into a small but balanced, well trained, and competent force. With plans based on a sound strategy andadvantages accruing on account of a vastly improved coastal setup, it is capable of giving a befitting response to any challenge posed by the Indian Navy and accomplishing its assigned mission in case of hostilities.
The writer is a retired commodoreof Pakistan Navy.
